國家領導人面臨經濟難題

The Chinese government recently announced a series of measures that aim to stabilize the country's economy, spur economic growth and boost confidence in the long-term viability of China's growth model. These goals are especially important as China seeks greater independence from the United States, both as a destination market for China's exports and as a source for high-tech inputs. The recent moves have once again put the spotlight on the headwinds facing China's economy and Beijing's efforts to address them.
中國經濟面臨阻力，政府宣布了一系列重要舉措來應對，目的是穩定經濟，刺激經濟增長，增強人們對中國經濟模式長期可行性的信心。

In late September, China took many observers by surprise when the government announced a slew of monetary policies throwing a lifeline to banks, property owners and equity investors. The People's Bank of China lowered the reserve requirement rate as well as the lending interest rate. Mortgage holders received cuts, including for second homes, which President Xi Jinping has in the past frowned upon as they go against his mantra of "homes are for living in." Local governments received additional funding support to turn excess housing stock into affordable housing units, a government priority. Finally, the stock market received a boost through numerous measures designed to increase the market value of listed companies, including lowering the required amount on hand for so-called margin trading. 中國人民銀行下調了存款和貸款率利，貸款買房有折扣；地方政府獲得額外資金，協助(物業主)把多餘的高端住房變成經濟適用房；提振股市價值，降低搞保證金交易所要求的手上現金數量。

In the week following the announcements, China's stock markets responded with a burst of activity, as investors looking for quick gains spurred a rally. Much of this activity was fueled by individual retail investors, who lack many other investment opportunities, particularly with the real estate market's downturn and restrictions on investing abroad. These investors are especially mobilized by policy announcements from the government, seeing them as more reliable signals on the economy than the performance of individual firms or even sectors. While this makes government policy almost immediately effective, it also runs the risks of quick ups and downs if the announced measures do not ultimately seem aggressive enough to boost investor confidence over the long term.
這些舉措引起中國股市大幅波動--尋求快速發財的個人散戶投資刺激了股市上漲，因房市低迷，海外投資受限，他們沒有多少其它投資機會，並相信政府政策公告--可惜他們對長線投資信心仍然不足。

So far this seems to be what has happened with these measures. Since the initial announcement, investors and pundits have been largely disappointed with what followed, as the large package to revive the stock markets have not yet been matched by a big fiscal stimulus. A press conference held by the National Development and Reform Commission on Oct. 8 promised more fiscal stimulus to come, but did not provide specific details, resulting in the sharpest declines on Chinese stock markets in 27 years and erasing the gains that followed the initial announcement. A subsequent Finance Ministry press conference unveiled some policies to aid low-income people, but without any further details on any other measures, let alone the big whammy that the market demanded, leaving investors still underwhelmed.
現在投資者很失望，因為大規模財政刺激未能重振股市。發改委和財政部的召開新聞發布會，做出更多沒有細節的承諾，導致股市大跌。

Some of the lackluster reaction is attributable to how the Chinese government communicates and how funding decisions work. The Finance Ministry cannot announce a massive target stimulus on its own initiative. That must come from the State Council after the decision is passed through the National People's Congress, which has the nominal power to spend.
資金決策本應在全國人民代表大會通過後由國務院提出，人大擁有名義上的支出權。略過人大是市場反應冷淡的原因之一。

However, there is a more fundamental challenge that the Chinese government faces, which is the desire to boost confidence without unleashing unrealistic expectations on the part of Chinese consumers and investors. That balancing act between raising confidence and managing expectations is especially difficult for Xi, because even as the government seeks to improve the overall economic picture, Xi has refused to give into demands to liberalize, redistribute or deviate from his commitment to tech-intensive growth.
然而面臨的基本挑戰是：既要提振信心，又不能讓消費者和投資者產生不切實際的期望。最難的是，習近平還拒絕屈服於市場自由化的要求。

This is because Xi doesn't just seek to achieve independence from the United States. He wants to do so while also ensuring the Chinese government has the autonomy and power to drive the economy forward in line with his vision, unencumbered by the welfare demands of its citizens or the profit demands from domestic and international investors. 他尋求擺脫對美國的依賴，同時又希望中國能自主發展，而且不想受到民眾福利和國內外投資者尋求利潤等因素的束縛。

Xi made this point in 2017, when the Chinese Communist Party redefined the principal contradiction facing the Party in the "new era," a period of immense global tumult. As he noted in his address to the 19th Party Congress in 2017, "what we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life." This requires that the party not only seek to maintain growth at 5 percent or above, but also that it manage and contain the nature of those "ever-growing" popular needs. This is especially the case for fiscal reforms that would increase taxation and redistribute more wealth to low-income households. Xi rejects measures such as these, despite their potential laudatory effects on confidence and consumer spending, arguing that they lead to laziness and "welfarism." As a result, the government has been loath to increase expectations that it will do more to support households through fiscal transfers. 習近平在2017年黨的十九大報告中指出「我們的發展不平衡、不充分，和人民生活需要有矛盾」。所以需要維持5%以上的增長，還要遏制「不斷增長的」民眾需求，但習近平拒絕增加稅收或重新分配給低收入家庭等等財政改革，認為會導致懶惰和「福利主義」。

Part of this is due to the historical legacies of previous stimulus packages, which haunt the current government. The stimulus offered in 2008 following the global financial crisis boosted growth and employment at a critical time, but it was also responsible for the real estate bubble and local government debt spiral that followed. But the impact of that package-China's largest ever-went much further, permeating every aspect of the economy. As boom times lent a sense of confidence and opportunity, workers were emboldened to ask for more, driving up wages in manufacturing and construction. Major labor strikes in 2010 in the automotive industry and in 2014 among migrant workers demanding social security payouts tested the government in new ways.
2008年全球金融危機後推出的刺激措施提振了經濟增長和就業，但也造成隨之而來的房地產泡沫和地方政府債務螺旋式上升，滲透到經濟的各層面。2010年和2014年兩次工人罷工推高了製造業和建築業的工資。

In 2015, Xi's administration was burned again by policies meant to channel investment into equity markets. When the government took steps to tamp down the rampant speculation that followed, the stock market crashed. The same pattern seems to be repeating itself now, as the recent market rally won't be sustained if a more consequential and detailed reform plan isn't released soon. Unlike in 2015, however, retail investors have few other options, as the property market is still declining and outside investment opportunities have been further curtailed.
2015年，政府引導資金進入股市，以至於投機行為猖獗。當政府採取措施壓制投機時，股市崩潰了。如今，同樣的模式正在重演，若無下一步詳細計劃，近期財政部搞「大水漫灌」所引起的市場反彈就不會持續。

The critical question for China going forward is whether it can renew confidence in the economy when the economic model that Xi promotes promises neither massive rewards for capital nor substantial redistribution to households. If the answer is no, then something will have to give.
關鍵問題：當習近平所推動的經濟模式既不承諾為資本帶來巨額回報，也不承諾對普通家庭進行大量的收入再分配時，中國能否重拾對經濟的信心？

Mary Gallagher is the Marilyn Keough Dean of the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame(聖母大學國際事務系教務主任).